Understanding the Criminal Charges Arising From the Massachusetts State Police Academy Death of Trooper Enrique Delgado-Garcia
By Patrick L. Garrity, Boston Criminal Defense Attorney and Co-Counsel for Lt. Jennifer Penton
The death of Massachusetts State Police recruit Enrique Delgado-Garcia during his training at the Massachusetts State Police Academy has resulted in one of the Commonwealth's most closely watched criminal prosecutions involving law-enforcement training.
In February 2026, Massachusetts Attorney General Andrea Campbell and independent investigator David Meier announced indictments against four Massachusetts State Police officials arising from Delgado-Garcia's September 2024 death. Lt. Jennifer Penton, who was a supervisor at the Academy, was charged with involuntary manslaughter, causing serious bodily injury to a participant in a physical-exercise training program, and perjury. Troopers Edwin Rodriguez, David Montanez, and Casey LaMonte were charged with involuntary manslaughter and the physical-training offense. All of the defendants have pleaded not guilty.
I serve as co-counsel for Lt. Jennifer Penton along with Attorney Brad Bailey.
Because the criminal cases remain pending, this article does not discuss confidential discovery, attorney-client communications, protected information, defense work product, or evidence that has not been made public through court proceedings or other authorized public sources.
Nor is the purpose of this article to try the case outside the courtroom.
Instead, the case provides an opportunity to explain several Massachusetts criminal-law principles that can easily become obscured when a high-profile prosecution is discussed in headlines: what involuntary manslaughter actually requires, what Massachusetts means by “wanton or reckless” conduct, when an alleged failure to act can result in criminal liability, how causation fits into a homicide prosecution, and what the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Criminal Charges Against Lt. Jennifer Penton
According to the Massachusetts Attorney General's public announcement, a Middlesex County grand jury returned three charges against Lt. Penton:
- involuntary manslaughter;
- causing serious bodily injury to a person participating in a training program involving physical exercise, under G.L. c. 265, § 40; and
- perjury, under G.L. c. 268, § 1.
The charges arise from the death of Enrique Delgado-Garcia, who was participating in the 90th Recruit Training Troop at the Massachusetts State Police Academy in New Braintree. He died on September 13, 2024, after suffering injuries during Academy training.
The Commonwealth has publicly alleged that the instructors' conduct surrounding boxing-related training amounted to wanton or reckless conduct and that their acts or omissions resulted in Delgado-Garcia's death. Those remain allegations that the prosecution must prove in court.
The Attorney General's own announcement expressly notes what is fundamental to every Massachusetts criminal prosecution:
The charges are allegations, and each defendant remains innocent unless and until proven guilty.
An Indictment Is Not a Finding of Guilt
This distinction becomes especially important in a highly publicized case.
A grand jury indictment means that the Commonwealth presented evidence sufficient for a grand jury to find probable cause to charge an offense.
It does not mean that a trial jury has found the allegations true.
It does not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
And it does not relieve the Commonwealth of proving every required element of every charge at trial.
The courtroom process following indictment is where the defense receives and examines discovery, litigates legal and evidentiary issues, challenges the government's proof where appropriate, and ultimately requires the Commonwealth to satisfy the much higher trial standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
What Is Involuntary Manslaughter in Massachusetts?
The phrase “involuntary manslaughter” can sound straightforward.
The legal standard is not.
Massachusetts' current Model Jury Instructions describe involuntary manslaughter based on wanton or reckless conduct as an unlawful killing unintentionally caused by wanton or reckless conduct.
Where the Commonwealth relies upon an affirmative act, it generally must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
- the defendant caused the person's death;
- the defendant intended the conduct alleged to have caused the death; and
- the conduct was wanton or reckless.
Importantly, the Commonwealth does not have to prove that the defendant intended for anyone to die.
But it must prove considerably more than simply that something went wrong or that a different decision could have been made.
Negligence Is Not Involuntary Manslaughter
This may be one of the most important distinctions in Massachusetts involuntary-manslaughter law.
The Supreme Judicial Court's 2026 homicide instructions expressly state that negligence is not enough.
Wanton or reckless conduct requires conduct creating a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another person. It involves a grave risk of harm undertaken with indifference to or disregard of the consequences.
Massachusetts law therefore recognizes a meaningful distinction between:
something that should have been done differently
and:
criminally wanton or reckless conduct.
That distinction can become critical when criminal charges arise from conduct occurring in a professional, institutional, medical, supervisory, educational, or training environment.
A tragic outcome alone does not define the criminal standard.
The Commonwealth still has to prove the elements required by Massachusetts law.
What Does “Wanton or Reckless” Mean?
The phrase has a specific legal meaning.
Massachusetts instructs juries that wanton or reckless conduct creates a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result.
The analysis can involve both what the particular defendant actually knew and what a reasonable person possessing the same relevant knowledge would have understood about the risk.
That means criminal responsibility cannot be determined simply by looking backward after an injury has occurred and asking whether the outcome was terrible.
A jury must evaluate the defendant's conduct and the circumstances under which the conduct occurred.
The focus remains on what the Commonwealth can prove about the defendant's actions, knowledge, circumstances, and the degree of risk at the relevant time.
Can Someone Be Charged With Manslaughter for Failing to Act?
Yes, but Massachusetts law imposes additional requirements.
An omission or failure to act does not ordinarily become involuntary manslaughter simply because someone theoretically could have done something.
Where the prosecution relies on a failure-to-act theory, the current Massachusetts homicide instructions require proof of a legally recognized duty.
The Commonwealth generally must establish beyond a reasonable doubt:
- that a special relationship gave rise to a duty of care, or that the defendant created a situation posing a grave risk of death or serious injury;
- that the failure to act caused the death;
- that the defendant intentionally failed to act; and
- that the failure to act was wanton or reckless.
That makes a criminal omission case analytically different from simply criticizing someone's response after the fact.
Duty, causation, intentional omission, and wanton or reckless conduct are separate legal requirements.
Why Causation Matters in a Massachusetts Manslaughter Case
A homicide prosecution also requires causation.
Massachusetts' model instructions explain that an act causes death where the act, in a natural and continuous sequence, results in death and without it the death would not have occurred.
Where the prosecution relies upon a failure to act, it likewise has to prove that the omission caused the death under the applicable legal standard.
Causation can therefore become one of the most important legal and factual issues in a complex involuntary-manslaughter prosecution.
It is not enough to establish that a defendant was present, held a supervisory position, participated in events surrounding an injury, or could have acted differently.
For criminal liability, the Commonwealth must prove the legally required connection between the particular defendant's conduct and the death.
Criminal Liability Is Individual
Cases involving multiple defendants can sometimes produce an understandable tendency to discuss everyone collectively.
Criminal trials do not work that way.
Each criminal defendant is presumed innocent.
The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving the charges against each individual defendant, based upon the elements applicable to that person and the evidence properly admitted against that person.
In a case involving an institution as large as the Massachusetts State Police, public discussion may naturally focus on what happened “at the Academy.”
A criminal prosecution asks a narrower question.
What can the Commonwealth prove beyond a reasonable doubt concerning the particular person charged?
That distinction is fundamental to individual criminal responsibility.
What Is G.L. c. 265, § 40?
The prosecution also charged Lt. Penton and the three other State Police officials under a relatively unusual Massachusetts statute dealing specifically with physical-exercise training programs.
General Laws c. 265, § 40 applies to a person who has direct management or direct control over the conduct of physical exercise as part of a course of study or training program and who “willfully, wantonly and recklessly” causes serious bodily injury to a participant.
The statute defines serious bodily injury as bodily injury creating a substantial risk of death or involving total disability or the loss or substantial impairment of a bodily function for a substantial period.
The statutory language therefore contains several distinct concepts that have to be analyzed rather than assumed:
- direct management or direct control;
- physical exercise as part of a qualifying training program;
- willful, wanton and reckless conduct;
- causation; and
- serious bodily injury.
As with every criminal statute, the existence of a severe injury does not eliminate the Commonwealth's obligation to prove the other required elements.
Why the Physical-Training Charge Is Legally Different From Manslaughter
Although the charges arise from the same underlying events, G.L. c. 265, § 40 and involuntary manslaughter are different offenses.
The manslaughter charge concerns an alleged unlawful killing caused by wanton or reckless conduct or omission.
Section 40 specifically addresses serious bodily injury occurring in a physical-exercise training program and contains its own requirement concerning direct management or control over the exercise.
That means the legal analysis cannot simply collapse all of the charges into a general allegation of “unsafe training.”
The Commonwealth must establish the elements of the offense actually charged.
The Separate Perjury Charge Against Lt. Penton
Lt. Penton also faces a separate perjury indictment arising from testimony during the investigation.
The Commonwealth has publicly alleged that Penton made a false statement before the grand jury concerning when she first learned about reported concussion-like symptoms. Lt. Penton has pleaded not guilty to that charge as well.
Under G.L. c. 268, § 1, perjury generally requires proof that a person who was lawfully required to testify truthfully in a judicial proceeding or proceeding in the course of justice willfully made a false statement under oath concerning a material matter.
A mistake, misunderstanding, imprecise recollection, or immaterial discrepancy is therefore not automatically synonymous with criminal perjury.
Like every other criminal charge, the Commonwealth must prove the statutory elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Because the perjury prosecution remains pending, it would be inappropriate to discuss nonpublic evidence or protected grand-jury material beyond what has been publicly alleged.
Why High-Profile Criminal Cases Require Discipline Outside the Courtroom
The death of Trooper Delgado-Garcia understandably generated substantial public attention.
It involved the Massachusetts State Police.
It involved a young recruit who died while pursuing a career in law enforcement.
It led to a lengthy independent investigation.
And the eventual charging announcement was accompanied by substantial press coverage and public statements by government officials.
Those circumstances make public interest inevitable.
They do not change the rules governing a criminal prosecution.
The defendants remain entitled to the presumption of innocence, due process, the right to challenge the Commonwealth's evidence, the right to confront witnesses, and the right to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
For defense lawyers handling a high-profile criminal case, one of the most important responsibilities is ensuring that the public narrative does not replace the evidentiary process.
A press conference is not a trial.
An allegation is not evidence simply because it appears in a headline.
And an indictment is not a conviction.
The Importance of the Complete Evidentiary Record
Criminal cases involving a death can generate enormous quantities of evidence.
The eventual legal analysis may involve eyewitness testimony, medical evidence, training records, institutional records, expert testimony, communications, timelines, policies, and other evidence.
The defense lawyer's role is to review that material carefully and independently rather than begin with the assumption that the government's initial description of the case answers every legal question.
That principle applies far beyond the Jennifer Penton prosecution.
In any serious Massachusetts criminal case, particularly one involving homicide allegations, defense counsel has to separately examine:
What happened?
What does the admissible evidence establish?
What does the applicable criminal statute actually require?
Can the Commonwealth prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt?
Those questions may sound simple.
They are the foundation of criminal defense.
The Difference Between Tragedy and Criminal Liability
Some criminal cases begin with events that are indisputably tragic.
The existence of a tragedy, however, does not itself answer whether a particular person committed a crime.
Criminal liability requires proof of legally defined conduct, legally defined mental states where applicable, causation, and every other element established by the Legislature and Massachusetts courts.
That distinction is especially important in an involuntary-manslaughter prosecution because the alleged killing is, by definition, unintentional.
The legal dispute centers not upon an intent to kill, but upon whether the Commonwealth can prove the conduct reached the much higher criminal threshold of wanton or reckless behavior and caused the death.
Massachusetts law expressly distinguishes that level of culpability from ordinary negligence.
The Jennifer Penton and Enrique Delgado-Garcia Cases Remain Pending
As of this writing, the criminal cases arising from Enrique Delgado-Garcia's death remain pending.
Lt. Jennifer Penton and the other charged State Police officials have pleaded not guilty. Court proceedings continued during the summer of 2026.
No jury has found Lt. Penton guilty of any offense.
No final determination has been made concerning the allegations against her.
The appropriate place for those issues to be resolved is the courtroom, based upon admissible evidence and the burden of proof required by Massachusetts law.
About Patrick L. Garrity
Patrick L. Garrity is a Boston criminal defense attorney at Brad Bailey Law, P.C. and serves as co-counsel for Lt. Jennifer Penton in the criminal cases arising from the death of Massachusetts State Police recruit Enrique Delgado-Garcia. Patrick's role as co-counsel has been publicly identified in connection with the pending Worcester and Middlesex Superior Court matters.
Patrick represents individuals in serious Massachusetts state and federal criminal cases and has substantial experience in Massachusetts Superior Court litigation, jury trials, homicide-related matters, perjury allegations, constitutional motion practice, expert evidence, complex discovery, and high-profile criminal cases.
His broader practice includes serious felony defense, sex-crime prosecutions, firearms offenses, white-collar and public-corruption matters, federal criminal defense, pretrial motions, and criminal investigations.
Patrick regularly writes about Massachusetts criminal procedure and significant criminal cases to explain the legal standards behind prosecutions receiving public attention.
This article is based solely on publicly available information and general Massachusetts law. It does not disclose or rely upon confidential attorney-client communications, protected discovery, grand-jury material not otherwise publicly disclosed, defense work product, or other nonpublic information concerning Lt. Penton's pending cases. Nothing in this article should be understood as a factual concession or as an attempt to litigate the pending charges outside the courtroom. Lt. Penton is presumed innocent unless and until the Commonwealth proves otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.