Howes, Warden v. Fields
regarding custodial interrogation will have limited impact since it specifically
relates to questioning of incarcerated inmates, it is nonetheless instructive
as to the High Court’s continued intransience/resistance in expanding
its seminal holding in
Miranda v. Arizona. In
Fields, SCOTUS essentially found "insufficient custody" for
Miranda
purposes where the inmate/petitioner was questioned about his alleged
criminal activit[ies] prior to his incarceration for five to six hours
by armed deputies, while seated in a prison conference room. The conference
room door was "sometimes open" and other times shut, and on
several occasions the petitioner said he did not want to answer any more
questions. Moreover, he was required to wait in the conference room for
twenty minutes after the interrogation had ended, before he was escorted
by deputies back to his prison cell. According to SCOTUS, in spite of
the absence of
Miranda warnings in this case, imprisonment does not necessarily create a custodial
situation for "
Miranda
purposes" (i.e., for
Miranda
to apply). As head-scratching as that conclusion may seem, the further
suggestion that incarcerated persons don’t gauge their freedom in
the way that those not yet restrained do because "questioning a person
who is already incarcerated does not generally involve the shock that
very often accompanies arrest; a prisoner is unlikely to be lured into
speaking by a longing for prompt release; and a prisoner knows that his
questioner probably lacks authority to affect the duration of his sentence"
is even more of a stretch! Obviously, and not necessarily facetiously,
the SCOTUS majority has not spent much time in jails or in prisons. Those
who have (I once also served as Sheriff) understand well the inherently
coercive atmosphere that exists behind bars, especially in terms of interactions
with corrections personnel ( i.e., one’s jailers) which often results
in "Yes, Sir! No, Sir!" types of relationships. In prison, lack
of cooperation can, and does, lead to disciplinary action and disciplinary
action can and does result in loss of day to day privileges, loss of accrued
good time, segregation, and isolation. Moreover, the "institutionally
adjusted" inmate quickly learns that getting up and walking away
from authority in a highly regulated and structured environment is never
a good idea. And with an all too real taste of prison, who’s to
say that fear of receiving even more prison time as a result of new charges
possibly being filed isn’t more compelling than anything? Now, I
think it’s a mistake to read too much into
Fields
and as I said, its overall applicability remains limited. I doubt criminal
defense attorneys like me will find much practical use from it, except
further confirmation of what we already know: that SCOTUS is not only
not going to be expanding
Miranda
any time soon, but may well be looking for opportunities to dial it back
and narrow it down.
